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1 INTRODUCTION 
For effective development of advanced air traffic 
operations, safety risk analysis forms a primary 
source of feedback to assure that safety risks at the 
air traffic capacity-level required are acceptable. 
Early guidance of operational development on safety 
grounds can help to avoid a potentially costly rede-
velopment programme. Moreover, analysis of safety 
risk against appropriate safety criteria is a require-
ment for implementation of advanced operations; 
see for instance (EC Commission, 2005; Eurocon-
trol, 2001). Apostolakis (2004) provides a perspec-
tive on the usefulness of quantitative risk assess-
ments. 
Given the crucial roles of air traffic controllers 
and pilots in maintaining safety of air traffic opera-
tions, their performance is an essential part of such 
safety risk analyses. In line with this, air traffic con-
trollers and pilots provide expertise that is crucial to 
perform the analyses. In this article, the various roles 
of air traffic controllers and pilots in safety risk 
analyses are discussed by means of an example op-
eration in which taxiing aircraft cross the active 
Runway 18C/36C at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: 
− Section 2 outlines the steps in a safety risk analy-
sis and indicates for which steps the roles of air 
traffic controllers and pilots will be addressed; 
− Section 3 sketches an operation that will be used 
to illustrate the approach; 
− Section 4 and 5 focus on the role of controllers 
and pilots in hazard identification and argumenta-
tion-based safety risk analysis; 
− Section 6 outlines the use of simulation-based 
safety risk analysis, simulation of controller and 
pilot activities and the use of operational expert 
knowledge in such analyses; 
− Section 7 briefly addresses the necessity of con-
troller and pilot involvement in providing feed-
back to the operational developers; 
− Section 8 addresses other aspects of the involve-
ment of operational experts in safety risk analy-
ses; and 
− Section 9 presents the conclusions. 
2 SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS STEPS 
This section indicates a generic safety risk analysis 
cycle for development of advanced air traffic opera-
tions (Blom et al., 2006). The steps in the safety risk 
analysis cycle are shown in Figure 1.  
In step 0, the objective of the analysis is deter-
mined, as well as the safety regulatory context, 
scope and level of detail of the analysis. Next, the 
operation to be assessed is determined (step 1). The 
actual safety risk analysis starts by identifying 
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Figure 1: Safety risk analysis cycle 
 
Decision 
making
Determine 
operation1
Assess risk 
tolerability6
Identify 
severities4
Identify safety 
bottlenecks7
Assess 
frequency5
Construct 
scenarios3Identifyhazards2
Iterate
(option)
Identify 
objective0
Operational
development
hazards associated with the operation (step 2), and 
aggregating these into safety relevant scenarios (step 
3). Using severity and frequency assessments (steps 
4 and 5), the safety risk associated with each safety 
relevant scenario is classified (step 6). For each 
safety relevant scenario with a (possibly) unaccept-
able safety risk, the hazards and/or conditions con-
tributing to insufficient safety, named safety bottle-
necks, are identified (step 7). This safety feedback 
supports operational concept developers to identify 
for which safety issues they should develop im-
provements in the operational design. If the design is 
changed, it is verified by another safety risk analysis 
cycle whether safety has improved sufficiently. This 
apparently laborious way to analyse changes to an 
operation is necessary since the changes may have 
introduced new hazards or increased the risk of sce-
narios with previously acceptable safety risk. Such 
unintentional consequences of changes are easily 
missed by looking only at the previously unaccept-
able scenario. 
The safety risk analysis methods used in these 
steps may depend on particular aspects of the safety 
relevant scenario and the iteration number in the 
safety risk analysis cycle. This variety in safety risk 
analysis methods is most prominent in step 5 (assess 
frequency). In step 5, for each possible severity out-
come of a safety relevant scenario, the occurrence 
frequency is evaluated via an appropriate tree, which 
describes the probability of the top event in the tree 
as a sum of a product of probabilities of applicable 
conditional events. In a first iteration cycle, the fac-
tors in this tree are usually assessed by argumenta-
tion-based evaluation, for which the primary sources 
of data stem from interviews with operational ex-
perts and safety databases. In subsequent iteration 
cycles, the quality of the risk estimate may be im-
proved by using dedicated Monte Carlo simulations, 
which are based on a stochastic dynamic model of 
the operation.         
This paper explains the role of controllers and pi-
lots in the safety risk analysis cycle: 
− Pushing the boundary between imaginable an 
unimaginable hazards in hazard identification 
(step 2); 
− Providing expert knowledge for argumentation-
based and Monte Carlo simulation-based safety 
risk analysis (especially step 5); 
− Identifying potential mitigating measures (step 7); 
and 
− Providing a basis for acceptance of the introduc-
tion of an advanced operation as representative of 
the operation’s key users (supports decision mak-
ing step). 
3 EXAMPLE OPERATION 
The safety risk analysis cycle and the roles of con-
trollers and pilots therein are illustrated by an analy-
sis applied to an active runway crossing operation at 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. In this operation, 
Runway 18C/36C is used for departures or arrivals, 
whereas taxiing aircraft have to pass it on their ways 
to or from Runway 18R/36L. See Figure 2 for Run-
way 18C/36C with surrounding taxiways. 
During the development of the infrastructure and 
the operation, the air traffic control provider and the 
airport have initially considered crossings over 
Runway 18C/36C, in order to keep the taxi times be-
tween the airport centre and the far-off Runway 
18R/36L as low as possible. However, safety risk 
analysis of this operation yielded potentially danger-
ous situations (hazards) that had not played a role in 
the development of the operation up to then. The 
identification of these hazards was therefore consid-
ered very valuable by the developers of the opera-
tion. Because of these and other findings, the opera-
tion has been developed further. 
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In the currently considered operation, taxiing to and 
from Runway 18R/36L takes place via a southern 
taxiway (see below “36C” in Figure 2). Taxiing can-
not be performed independently in case there is traf-
fic landing on Runway 18C/36C from the south, or 
taking off to the south. The air traffic controller for 
Runway 18C/36C is responsible for safe dependent 
taxiing on the southern taxiway. The controller gives 
permission to use the southern taxiway by means of 
an instruction to the pilots of the taxiing aircraft in 
combination with switching off a red stopbar.  
4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
The term hazard is defined in a wide sense; i.e., an 
event or situation with possibly negative effects on 
safety. Such a non-nominal event or situation may 
evolve into danger, or may hamper the resolution of 
the danger, possibly in combination with other haz-
ards or under certain conditions. In step 2 of the 
safety risk analysis cycle, hazard identification 
brainstorming sessions are used as primary means to 
identify hazards. Identification of as many as possi-
ble hazards is a prerequisite for a good safety risk 
analysis. After all, hazards that are left unidentified 
may lead to a too optimistic safety perspective. 
In system engineering, the functional approach to 
hazard identification is well-known. This approach 
attempts to determine all possible failure conditions 
and their effects, for each function that plays a role 
in the operation, including the human operator tasks. 
Unfortunately, the approach cannot identify all haz-
ards related to an operation that involves human op-
erators. An important reason for this is that the per-
formance of air traffic controllers and pilots depend 
on their (subjective) situational awareness. From a 
human cognition perspective a particular act by an 
air traffic controller or pilot can be logical, whereas 
from a function allocation perspective the particular 
act may be incorrect. Such occurrences are often 
called “errors of commission” (Sträter et al., 2004). 
An example of an error of commission in the cross-
ing operation is that, because of the complicated 
taxiway structure, a pilot thinks that he is still taxi-
ing far from the runway, whereas in reality he al-
ready crosses the runway without noticing any of the 
runway signs. 
Another well-known technique of hazard identifi-
cation is the HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability) 
method. With this method, hazards are identified and 
analyzed using sessions with operational experts. At 
the same time, the experts come up with potential 
solutions and measures to cope with the identified 
hazards (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992). The advan-
tage of HAZOP with respect to the functional ap-
proach is that also non-functional hazards are identi-
fied. However, in applying HAZOP, one needs to 
take care that hazard analysis and solution activities 
do not disturb the hazard identification process, 
which could leave hazards unidentified. Moreover, 
one needs to be aware that potential solutions may 
introduce new hazards. 
With the experience of a large number of safety risk 
analyses for air traffic operations, and on the basis of 
knowledge from other safety-critical industries, a 
method for shifting the boundary between imagin-
able and unimaginable hazards for air traffic opera-
tions has been developed in a study for EUROCON-
TROL (De Jong, 2004). Subsequently, this method 
has been incorporated in Version 2 of EUROCON-
TROL’s Safety Assessment Methodology (EUROCON-
TROL, 2005).  
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The method involves pure brainstorming sessions 
with air traffic controllers and pilots. In such ses-
sions no analysis is done and solutions are not iden-
tified. One needs to perform brainstorming sessions 
with an air traffic controller and pilot that are able to 
play devil’s advocates. It is important to help and 
not to suppress identification of seemingly remote 
hazards; they may turn out to bear significant risk af-
ter careful analysis or may trigger identification of 
other more relevant hazards. 
Besides the aforementioned error of commission, 
some hazards for the example operation identified 
by the pure brainstorming approach are: 
− Controllers abuse the alerting system for effi-
ciency reasons; and 
− A pilot has counted down the prescribed wake 
vortex separation time with the previous take-off 
and he starts to take off without clearance. 
5 EXPERT KNOWLEDGE IN ARGUMEN-
TATION-BASED SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS 
The identified hazards are structured into safety 
relevant scenarios, which comprise bundles of 
event/condition sequences and their effects (step 3 in 
Figure 1). These scenarios are usually centred 
around a general situation with potential safety ef-
fects, such as a conflict between an aircraft taking 
off and a taxiing aircraft approaching the runway. 
Subsequently, for each of the safety relevant scenar-
ios, it is determined which severity categories apply 
to its possible effects (step 4) and for each possible 
severity category the frequency of occurrence is 
evaluated (step 5).  
Operational experts again play a crucial rule in the 
safety risk analysis by answering questions such as: 
− How often does a given hazard occur? In the 
crossing operation, example hazards are a runway 
incursion or a take-off without clearance; and 
− How likely is it that such a situation results in an 
incident? How large is, for instance, the condi-
tional probability that an air traffic controller de-
tects and resolves an imminent runway incursion? 
Such questions are often difficult to answer. After 
all: 
− For advanced operation designs there is usually 
little relevant experience; 
− An operation includes many agents (e.g., pilots, 
controllers, navigation systems, alert systems), 
which interact with each other, making the out-
comes of scenarios difficult to analyse; and 
− Hazardous situations may occur so rarely that 
relevant statistical data is not available. 
Therefore it is often hard to give direct quantitative 
estimates of expected occurrence frequencies. A way 
to proceed is to identify the relevant operational ex-
pertise for the current operation, supplement it with 
statistical data and use expert judgement and argu-
mentation to extrapolate to the advanced operation. 
Hence, controllers and pilots remain crucial sources 
of information. They are asked how often they have 
experienced situations similar to those under as-
sessment in their careers, to give indications of like-
liness and timeliness of detecting and resolving con-
flicts and to argue and estimate how all of this would 
change in the advanced operation. 
A challenge in using operational expert judge-
ment is that different experts generally give different 
estimates. The question is how to combine answers 
of different experts; one expert will probably give 
more realistic estimates than the other, perhaps some 
experts are too optimistic and others too pessimistic. 
(Cooke & Goossens, 2000) give principles for good 
usage of expert judgement and an approach to “cali-
brate” experts using questions with known answers, 
for instance from statistics. In this way, one can ac-
count for experts estimating systematically too high 
or too low, and assign a larger weight to experts 
whose estimates usually corroborate well with facts 
than to experts whose estimates are further off. This 
approach yields better estimates with substantiated 
uncertainty margins. The principles for good usage 
have been applied in the safety risk analyses per-
formed, but it turns out that calibration is not always 
feasible, as this may need more experts than avail-
able. 
One of the findings obtained in the argumenta-
tion-based analysis of the example operation is that 
radiotelephony communication between controllers 
and pilots is a safety bottleneck: 
− The “lost” pilots (recall the error of commission 
example) might not even be on the right fre-
quency, making quick resolution of an impeding 
runway incursion by controllers very difficult; 
and 
− Even for pilots on the right frequency, the chance 
of an occupied frequency severely limits the con-
trollers’ effectiveness in resolving (impeding) 
runway incursions. 
6 SIMULATION-BASED SAFETY RISK 
ANALYSIS 
As noted in the last section, assessing the frequency 
of a severity category on the prime basis of expert 
judgement may be complicated by lack of experi-
ence with the designed operation and by dynamic in-
teraction of various agents (e.g., pilots, controllers, 
technical systems). Assessment of such difficult 
safety relevant scenarios can be supported by Monte 
Carlo simulations (Stroeve et al., 2003; Blom et al., 
2006). Such Monte Carlo simulations represent the 
relevant aspects of the operation, including aircraft 
trajectories, technical systems, procedures and the 
performance of air traffic controllers and pilots. 
Nominal as well as non-nominal situations are repre-
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sented, in which the latter category uses the knowl-
edge generated by hazard identification brainstorm-
ing. 
Consider for example the analysis of the probabil-
ity of a collision between an aircraft departing from 
a runway while a taxiing aircraft approaches the 
runway, for instance because it has entered a wrong 
taxiway. In the model used for the analysis, the run-
way controller performs a number of tasks. As a re-
sult of this, he is able to detect the conflict within a 
particular period of time and he will usually instruct 
the pilots, after a period depending among other 
things on the state of the communication systems. In 
reaction to such an instruction, the pilots will at-
tempt to prevent a possible accident, for instance by 
braking. In addition to conflict detection via the con-
troller, the traffic situation is also observed by the 
pilots, who may detect and react to a conflict as 
well. These processes of the controllers and pilots 
are performed in parallel and they depend on the ac-
tual traffic situation and the state of the relevant 
technical systems in the model. This involves the 
contextual control modelling of (Hollnagel, 1993). 
The simulated activities of a controller or pilot for 
a given traffic situation are based on an analysis of 
the tasks of these operators, a clustering of these 
tasks for the mathematical model and an identifica-
tion of priorities and possibilities to execute these 
task clusters simultaneously, given the traffic situa-
tion (Daams et al., 2000). Examples of task clusters 
for an air traffic controller are: 
− Monitoring: observation of the traffic situation; 
− Communication: communication of a clearance; 
and 
− Co-ordination: co-ordination with other air traffic 
controllers. 
In the model, aspects such as conditions to begin an 
activity, the duration of an activity, its effects and its 
dependence on the workload and the traffic situation 
are represented. 
The simulations represent the perception of the 
traffic situation and the related technical systems, 
operations and their interaction. Perception com-
prises observation and interpretation of the present 
and upcoming traffic situation and aspects related to 
this. As a result of the interaction between the vari-
ous operators and technical systems in the simula-
tions via processes such as observation and commu-
nication, inconsistencies can arise between the 
traffic pictures of the operators and/ or technical sys-
tems. These inconsistencies are typical examples of 
causes of errors of commission, because each opera-
tor and each technical system acts according to its 
own traffic picture. See (Corker, 2005; Blom et al., 
2003) for more general accounts of human perform-
ance modelling in the context of air traffic opera-
tions. 
 
For operations as complex as the active runway ex-
ample considered, a simulation model will always 
differ from reality. Hence, validation of the Monte 
Carlo simulation results does not mean that one 
should try to show that the model is perfect. Rather 
one should identify the differences between the 
simulation model and reality, and subsequently ana-
lyse what the effects of these differences are in terms 
of bias and uncertainty at the assessed risk level of 
the model (Everdij et al., 2006). Thinking in terms 
of these differences makes it possible to consider the 
validation problem as a problem of making the dif-
ferences specific, assessing each difference and its 
effect on the collision risk, and subsequently decide 
whether this is sufficiently accurate (valid) or not 
(invalid) for the purpose. With this approach, the 
validation of a simulation-based accident risk analy-
sis has largely become a bias and uncertainty as-
sessment process. This process includes identifica-
tion of differences between the simulation model 
and reality, assessment of the size of these differ-
ences, assessment of the risk sensitivity for differ-
ences, and assessment of the joint effect of these dif-
ferences. 
In attaining feedback on the differences between 
model and reality in the bias and uncertainty as-
sessment process, interviews with pilots and control-
lers play an important role. For the crossing opera-
tion example, a first analysis of the possible effects 
of such differences showed that the more important 
differences are related to task handling, conflict de-
tection and conflict resolution of pilots and control-
lers. Questions in the interviews with pilots and con-
trollers interviews for assessment of these 
differences cover for instance the duration of per-
forming tasks, reaction times, angles of view and the 
effects of actions to prevent collisions. On the basis 
of the answers of the operational experts, statistical 
data and additional Monte Carlo simulations, the ex-
pected accident risk and the uncertainty therein are 
given. 
 
For the example operation, the simulation-based 
analysis has made clear that although the runway 
controller identifies a good share of the conflicts, the 
contribution to timely resolution is relatively small. 
A significant part of the resolution instructions by 
the controller concerns conflicts already solved by 
pilots; another part of the instructions appears too 
late for the pilots to avoid successfully a collision. 
(This is partly because of the radio-telephony safety 
bottleneck mentioned before.) These dynamic as-
pects are very difficult to handle well in a purely ar-
gumentation-based analysis. 
7 FEEDBACK TO DECISION MAKING AND 
OPERATION DEVELOPMENT 
Evaluation of the combined severity and frequency 
assessments (steps 4 and 5 in Figure 1) with the risk 
criteria provides the risk tolerability of the safety 
relevant scenarios (step 6). For scenarios with (pos-
sibly) unacceptably high risk, the hazards and/or 
conditions that contribute most to the high risk level 
or its confidence interval are identified in step 7. 
These hazards and conditions are referred to as 
safety bottlenecks and they are important as they 
give developers of the advanced operation clues for 
searching potential risk mitigating measures of the 
operation. For scenarios in which unacceptable risk 
is possible in relation to large uncertainties, the 
safety bottlenecks indicate to the safety risk analysis 
experts where reduction of uncertainty has priority.   
Like identification of hazards, experience has 
taught that identification of mitigating measures 
cannot be done well only by engineers behind their 
desks. Operational expertise is necessary to be crea-
tive in identifying potential mitigating measures for 
safety-critical aspects and to get measures that 
would work in practice. 
A simple mitigating measure quickly identified 
for the example operation was to introduce traffic 
signs stating the correct radiotelephony frequency.  
Apart from risk being acceptable or at least toler-
able according to appropriate safety criteria, support 
of the prospective users of the operation (pilots and 
air traffic controllers) is crucial for introduction of 
an advanced operation. Management will have a 
very hard time introducing an operation if the opera-
tional experts do not support it. The endorsement of 
controllers and pilots of the safety risk analysis is a 
considerable step towards their support. In this way, 
operational experts indirectly play an important role 
in the decision-making process for the design and 
implementation of an advanced operation. To facili-
tate acceptance of the safety risk analysis’ results, 
the air traffic controllers and pilots involved in the 
safety risk analysis need to understand and trust the 
process of the safety risk analysis. They need to be a 
good sample of and well respected by the groups of 
operational experts they represent. 
8 CHALLENGES IN USING OPERATIONAL 
EXPERTS 
The previous sections have indicated crucial roles of 
air traffic controllers and pilots in several steps in 
safety risk analysis. This section gives some further 
advice on how to make the best use of operational 
experts in safety risk analyses. 
In the first place, air traffic controllers and pilots 
are professionals usually heavily occupied with their 
primary tasks. Consequently, they may not be easy 
to arrange for involvement in safety risk analyses. 
The importance of operational experts for safety risk 
analyses has to be acknowledged at management 
level to secure their participation. This obviously 
needs to be organised at an early stage of the safety 
risk analysis. 
The safety risk analysis needs to involve air traf-
fic controllers and pilots who have as much as pos-
sible up-to-date experience with current operations. 
The analysis of advanced operations becomes more 
difficult, if the experience of the operational experts 
is less in line with the latest developments, making 
the gap to the advanced operation even larger. Fur-
thermore, the acceptance of the safety risk analysis’ 
results by the general community of controllers and 
pilots is promoted better if the operational experts 
are actively involved in current air traffic operations. 
For hazard identification, air traffic controllers 
and pilots able to play devil’s advocates are neces-
sary. 
The operational experts involved in the argumen-
tation-based safety risk analysis (in particular the 
frequency assessment) and the simulation-based 
analysis (in particular the assessment of the model-
ling assumptions made) need to be able to look fur-
ther than their personal experience (to be able to es-
timate frequencies of rare events) and to be able to 
imagine how they would handle in such events. 
Large differences in the operational experts’ hori-
zons of imagination have been experienced. Al-
though the various tasks in safety risk analyses ask 
for slightly different characteristics of controllers 
and pilots, it is advised to involve a fixed group of 
these experts through the whole analysis. This 
minimizes the total time that needs to be spent on in-
troducing these experts to the advanced operation 
and explaining the process of the analysis and their 
role therein, and it allows the involved group to get a 
comprehensive picture of the analysis. 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, it is explained that air traffic control-
lers and pilots have a clearly discernable role in most 
steps of the safety risk analysis of air traffic opera-
tions: 
− Shifting the boundary between imaginable and 
unimaginable hazards; 
− Contribution of expert knowledge in argumenta-
tion-based analysis; 
− Contribution of expert knowledge for the simula-
tion model and assessment of model assumptions; 
− Facilitate acceptance of introduction of advanced 
operations by serving as representatives of the us-
ers of the operation; and 
− Identification of potential mitigating measures in 
case the safety risks of the advanced operation are 
not all acceptable. 
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